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Discount Beer February – How We Got Where We Are

(Much of the background information for the following comes from Allen Winn Sneath’s excellent book Brewed in Canada. I borrowed Ken Woods’ copy, but you should probably buy your own.)

The DISCOUNT BEER CATEGORY at The Beer Store exists for two reasons:

1)      Canadians didn’t drink enough Amstel in the late 1980’s

2)      You really liked those President’s Choice Decadent Chocolate Chip Cookies as a kid.

Clearly, this is going to take some explaining.

Picture it: Canada in 1992!

Brian Mulroney and his chin share the role of Prime Minister. Kelly Gruber is a sex symbol. Much Music is playing actual videos and the CBC is starting to phase out Beachcombers re-runs. The fine, stalwart, slightly inebriated people of Ontario cry out for cheap beer and their call is heeded by two men: Bill Sharpe and Dave Nichol.

Bill Sharpe had worked for at Pacific Western Brewing in BC and had done pretty well by them. He thought that he could make a go of private label contract brewing and approached Loblaws to gauge their interest. In order to take advantage of the situation, he would need a brewery and he would need financing to purchase a brewery.

He approaches Cott, who already produce the President’s Choice soda brands. They agree to finance the purchase of a brewery located in Hamilton, which until recently had been owned by Heineken and was used to produce Amstel. It was an unprofitable venture unless it was running at the full capacity of 330,000 HL and they unloaded it in 1991. The brewery is christened the LAKEPORT BREWING COMPANY and is operative by June, 1992. It brews a brand called Around Ontario. By September, they have created Laker and Laker Light. On December 11th, they launch President’s Choice Premium Draft.

You have to understand that Dave Nichol was as much of a rock star as a bespectacled, middle aged man with a canine sidekick who’s hawking a line of private label dipping sauces with names like “Memories of Bangkok” can possibly be. Personally, I think it was the chocolate chip cookies that did it. That, or the chocolate fudge crackle ice cream. The thing was that President’s Choice did really well as a store brand. Still does. They have their own TV show.

In 1992, they expanded to beer. The first batch of President’s Choice Premium Draft sold out basically immediately. In a genius marketing move, Lakeport takes out a full page newspaper ad, putatively apologizing to Dave Nichol, but really, capturing the attention of the public. The public ate it up and by June, 1993, Lakeport had 3% of the Ontario Market.

Was the beer any good? In a sense it didn’t matter. Dave Nichol was behind it. Did it matter that Dave Nichol didn’t drink beer? No, because the beer was cheap. At launch, Around Ontario was $5.95 for a six pack. PC Premium Draft was $12.50 a case. That undercut Molson and Labatt by about a dollar a case.

A dollar in price difference, or about eight and a half cents a beer, and suddenly, there’s an entire new category. In the summer of 1993, Molson introduces their Carling brand as a competitor and Labatt brings in Wildcat. The category is now 15% of the total Ontario Beer Market because “Hey. Eight and a half cents, man.”

The next few years are a little like a shell game run by a paranoid schizophrenic.

In 1994, President’s Choice decides to change over to Labatt. Dave Nichol, wheeler dealer that he was, still owned the recipes to Premium Draft, so they start brewing that at Lakeport under the name Dave Nichol. Essentially, there are now two identical beers competing against each other with no real differentiation in price.

In 1995, Cott sells the marketing rights to the Dave Nichol brand to Molson, meaning that Molson is now marketing a beer identical to the one Labatt is marketing. In the same year it sells Molson the rights to the Laker brands. Since Lakeport no longer has any brands to speak of, they launch a range simply called Lakeport, which uses the same recipes that Laker had used.

In 1996, Molson, possibly because they realized how bizarrely incestuous this was getting and decided that discretion was the better part of valour, sold the Laker brands to Brick, acquiring a small percentage of the ownership of that brewery in the process. Since Molson is fighting a battle to consolidate the ownership of their own company, using Brick as a cat’s paw to force Labatt to continue competing in a market segment is sheer Machiavellian genius, if not elegance in its simplicity. This puts Brick in a position where it can start acquiring other brands as well, like Formosa Springs.

In 1998, since the Lakeport Brewery hasn’t been running at full capacity, they go bankrupt. They’re taken over by Alpha Corporate Holdings.

By 2005, the discount category is a really big deal. That year, Brick sees a 325% rise in sales of their Laker brands. Lakeport has about 7% of the Ontario market share. President’s Choice, possibly sensing a shift in the wind, contracts their brews to Brick.

In 2006, the high point of the Buck-A-Beer craze, Lakeport has 11% of the Ontario Beer Market share and two of the top ten brands at The Beer Store.

In 2007, Labatt decides enough is enough and buys the Lakeport Brewing Company for 204 million bucks. That’s a pretty small price to pay for 11% of the market. (To give you an idea, that is 4% more than all of the craft beer market share in Ontario in 2013). They acquire the Lakeport brands and Brava.

In 2008, the Buck-A-Beer craze ends when Ontario raises the minimum beer price to $25.60. This obsoletes the incredibly catchy “Make ‘er a Laker, it’s a buck a beer” radio commercial, which we can all be thankful for.

In 2010, Labatt does something incredibly clever and decides not to sell a brewery capable of producing 10% of the beer in the province to a smaller, hungry rival in Minhas brewing. They do the sensible thing by gutting the brewery and figuratively salting the earth. This prevents anything like this concatenation of circumstances from ever occurring again, since no one really has the capacity to compete. It angers the Teamsters Union, but tactically it’s the best option.

In 2012, the minimum beer price in Ontario is raised to $29.35. There is no convenient way to turn this price into a catchy radio jingle, and for this we owe our thanks to the AGCO.

So, that’s why everyone owns all of the brands that they own even if many of those brands are more or less identical, historically. This sequence of events accounts for approximately 2/3rds of the entire market segment.

Wouldn’t it have been easier to just put down the cookies and enjoy an Amstel?

Detente OR How I learned to stop worrying and love Labatt

This week, I received an email from Labatt. They’re launching three new beers. Usually, they’ll put one beer out at a time and get some marketing behind it as an individual property. In this case, they’ve launched a platoon. There’s Blue Dry, a 6.1% version of Blue with a dry finish. There’s Blue Lime which is Blue with a real lime flavour added. They want me to tell you that it’s only available until September 30th. Finally, there’s Blue 55, which, as you may have guessed, is a version of Blue with 55 calories.

Now, It’s fairly obvious to anyone who has been following Canadian macro brewing in even a cursory way, that we’ve reached a state in the industry where MolsonCoors and AB-InBev are pretty much unwilling to let each other take a unique step forward. For two of those beers, it’s pretty clear that Labatt is shoring up their lineup to compete with Molson. Blue 55 is clearly a response to Molson Canadian 67. Blue Lime is pretty clearly a response to Molson Canadian 67 Sublime. I’m sure that Blue Dry is an answer to something, although I’m not sure what. Maybe Coldshots.

I’ve been trying to find something to compare this to, and the only thing I could think of is nuclear detente. Each company seems to be unwilling to allow the other an edge. Development of products is frequently retaliatory, and sometimes the launches are so close together that you realize there must be some corporate espionage going on.

Look at the launches, which occurred within a month of each other, of Rickard’s Blonde and Keith’s Ambrosia Blonde. Some detractors will point out that Rickard’s is a lager and Keith’s is an ale. It seems like a major detail, but in truth what you’ve got is two huge multinational companies with faux-craft subsidiaries launching similarly named products into the same market within four weeks of each other.

The details are meaningless beyond that point for the sake of my argument. I am not, as you will notice, pointing out anything about the quality of the beverages, which for all I know might be quite high.

I suppose that the train of thought must be “We cannot afford a trend gap. If we allow the other company to have a brand that we don’t have, they will develop an edge on us in the market. Their German-trained brewers might be better than our German-trained brewers.” In some ways, it’s a miracle that neither company has launched a dog into space for publicity.

Judging by that set of behaviour, it follows logically that they actually believe that a single brand from the other company making it big with the public could be the turning point that will lead to decreased market share, decreased revenue and eventual collapse.

I disagree. The problem with an arms race is that you’re in an arms race. The structure of the problem is the real issue. Think for a moment about the amount of money that the US and the USSR sank into their respective militaries and think about the cost of developing 7500 megatons of nuclear weaponry. You’ve got to keep it somewhere, after all. There’s so much funding invested in R&D and prolonging the stalemate that it eventually becomes untenable. Not only that, but you’re eventually committed to upkeep.

Between them, Molson and Labatt have enough brands to get us all really drunk several times over. And they’re locked in a stalemate because they seem to think that the best way to succeed is to thwart the movements of the opposition. The problem is that the stalemate is untenable as a corporate strategy for the reason that these are consumer products and not impersonal weapons.

Bob from Bala, Ontario has no preference about nuclear weapons other than that they not go off anywhere near Bala, Ontario. You can’t market various kinds of warheads as being “explodier” than others. There’s no ratenuke.com, although there may be a nukeadvocate.com run by either neo-cons or alternative energy lobbyists.

Bob might have a preference for a kind of beer, though. Let’s say that Bob started drinking Labatt Wildcat in 1994 or whenever it came out. He’s been drinking it for 17 years and it’s now the only thing that Bob will drink, since Bob’s a creature of habit who mows the lawn Friday afternoon and goes to church on Sunday and never puts the lid back on the toothpaste.

If Labatt were to discontinue Wildcat, they might really piss off Bob. And the same goes for all the other people out there like Bob who enjoy that beer. The really bad part is that for each company there is a similar base of customers for each brand. So, while each company can continue to increase the number of beers that they offer, they can’t really remove any without annoying the consumer base. This may go some way to explaining why we still have ice beers 15 years later. New brands don’t actually bring in new customers. They spread out the customer base that already exists. There are not magically more people just because you’ve got a marketing campaign.

If you think I’m exaggerating, I’ve actually done the research. Here’s a spreadsheet including many of the brands that each company has in The Beer Store. I’ve lined each product from each company up with what I feel is the opposite brand from the other company. You may not agree with some of them, but part of my decision making process in this case was to look at price structure. I have listed the prices for 12 bottles and 24 bottles where applicable. I have left out the European Imports that each company represents. I think you’ll be astonished by how little wiggle room there is between companies.

Here’s the thing, though, and it is pretty obvious. Molson’s Six Pints division under Creemore is a quanitity that doesnt exist at Labatt, and it’s Molson’s best chance at gaining an insurmountable advantage. If Labatt doesn’t acquire some craft brands in a desperate bid for Perestroika, the detente will be over within a matter of years. It will not have much immediate effect on the craft beer market, since the brands chosen will be unobjectionable to the majority of consumers and therefore of little interest to craft beer drinkers.

I hope that they acquire some craft properties. The detente is great for craft brewers. While Molson and Labatt fight over turf that no one really wants (55 calorie, 2.3% “beer” vs 67 calorie, 3.0% “beer”) we get to run amok with innovation and educate people who are starting to realize that flavour might be more important than advertising. It would be cynical to suggest that it’s important that Labatt holds a market share similar to that which Molson holds for as long as possible so that the overall market share of both companies can be chipped away at by the craft industry. It would also be pretty objectively accurate.

Something to ponder, anyway.